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Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D.,

JAPAN: NEXT CRISIS IN ASIA

Mr. President: The past ten years might well be termed the decade
of Crisis diplomacy.

Those charged with the conduct of foreign relations,

particularly in recent times seem to be involved in a continual race against
time. No sooner do they catch up with one crisis when another looms on the
horizon and they are off again in hot pursuit.

Trailing close behind them is

the lengthening shadow of the atomic annihilation of civilization.
It is inevitable in international relations no less than in human
relations that difficulties may sometimes arise suddenly and unexpectedly.
One of the principal functions of an effective foreign policy, however, is to
reduce such occurrences and to minimize their shock.
In this respect foreign policy is something like flood control.

We

take measures to make a Mississippi or a Missouri less dangerous to the
nation.

We heed the storm signals along the rivers and act to protect the

valleys from the rising waters.
By the same token foreign policy should serve to safeguard the
nation from perilous trends abroad.
without warning.
acute.

For the most part crises do not arise

The danger signs can be seen long before a situation becomes

In more recent years, nevertheless, crises have often been permitted

to creep up on us and strike suddenly.

Each shock of this kind adds to the

sense of futility which already grips many people in this country when they
try to understand the international problems of the nation.

- 2 I believe the c1tizens of the United Statca are willing to !ace these
problems but they must know what 1t is they have to face.

As it is now,

they arc confronted one day with the threat o( war and the next with the
promise of peace.

Th~t

alternating cycle of threat and promise serves only

to spread confusion and uncertainty in this country .

This is a weal<: base on

which to build support for the measures the United States must pursue in its
relation with other nations .
The people have a right to something more than a hand-to -mouth
foreign policy just as they have a right to expect more than that kind o£
existence at home.

They have a right to be kept fully and soberly informed

on gathering difficulties before, not after they reach the crisis -stage.

And

they have a right to know whether everything that can be done is being done to
minimize such difficulties.
Considerations of this kind lead me to return to a subject which I
raised initially on the floor o£ the Senate. August 13th last year .

Members

of the Senate will recall the state of our foreign policy at that time.

The

nation had been caught off-guard by a crisis in Indochina engendered by the
Geneva Conference and by another in France over the EDC.
It was necessary to deal with the immediate problems growing

out of these two situations, and they were dealt with, by the Southeast Asia
pact and by the London-Paris accords.

These devices, for all their merits,

however, served only to pick up the pieces .

They did little to catch up with

rapidly-moving developments either in Europe or Asia.
August, I pointed out that:

In my remarks last
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the tide of international affairs is flowing on in the aftermath of Geneva to new crests elsewhere on the globe (to)
areas which in the next few months may become keys of
decision in the struggle to turn back the drive of totalitarian communism . These areas arc Germany and
Japan.
In the months since last August, however, our foreign policy has
largely ignored these two key areas, particularly Japan .

The difficulties

inherent in them now are rapidly closing in on us.
Today, therefore, I want to redirect attention to one of these key
areas -- to Japan .

If we are not to face another crisis in that area then it

seems to me of the highest importance that we review the situation respecting
that Country without further delay. If we are ever to get out of the strait
jacket of crisis - foreign policy we must look beyond the immediate and prepar e
now to deal with what lies ahead.
We cannot of course ignore the pressing situation in the Formosan
Straits.

But no one seems to know at this time what will happen there.

The American people do not know.

The Senate does not know.

I doubt

whether even the President knows.

We have been told not once but many

times by the Executive Branch that developments in that area have been left
to the Chinese Communists.

Regardless of the outcome of the Formosan crises, however,
developments in Japan are of the greatest significance to the United States
and to all countries with interests in the Western Pacific.

There is not

likely to be a peaceful settlement in the Far East unless Japan is a party
to it.

Nor is there likely to be a major war in that part of the world into

which the Japanese will not inevitably be drawn.
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Yet,

in all the statements and press releases issued by the Executive Branch in
recent weeks the Japanese have gone virtually unnoticed.
tioned at all it is usually in an historical sense.

I£ they are men-

It is as though these

90 million people in the core of the Western Pacific had sunk into a hole in
the sea.
Japan has not disappeared.

The Japanese islands are still with us,

and beyond Formosa, beyond Korea they are the real objective of any
aggression originating on the Asian mainland.

They are the natural target

because they contain the greatest concentration of industrial plants and
industrial skills in Asia and that concentration includes the capacity for
developing atomic energy.

Japanese technical power welded to Chinese man-

power and resources could raise the power of Asian communism enormously
in a relatively short time.

I need hardly point out the towering threat that

this combination would represent not only to Alaska, the Philippines,
Australia, or New Zealand but to the American continent itself.
That is one prospect in the Japanese situation. It is not the only
one. It may be that instead of trending towards war, events in the Far East
will move away from war.

It may be that the cease-fire in Korea and the

cease-fire in Indochina are preliminaries to a similar truce in the Formosan
Straits.

If that is the case then the three points of military contact between

the communist and the free nations in the Western Pacific will have been
stabilized.

The stage will have been reached when a general settlement in

that region would become possible.
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factor.

They have much to contribute to the building of the conditions of

peace in Asia .

The ene rgy generated by their intelligence, their skills and

their industriousness must find a constructive outlet of this kind or it will
surely discover a destructive one.

The Japanese can go forward with other

nations in peaceful progress or they can turn off again on the road to renewed
conflict.

The only path not open to them is that which leads back to the Age of

Exclusion.
Before Japan drifts into the decisions from which there is no
returning, before the die is cast for war or peace in the Far East, it seems
to me essential that we ourselves comprehend fully what our objectives are
in that region.

It is also essential that we express these objectives through

our foreign policy with a clarity and an affirmativeness that will be understood by friend and foe alike. It is too late for that in Korea. It is too late
for that in Indochina. It is too late for that in Formosa.

We have drifted in

all of these regions until they have now become areas of crises and they are
being dealt with by a crisis-foreign policy.
It may still not be too late, however, in Japan .

This country's interests, as I understand those interests, would
best be served by a situation in which an independent and self-supporting
Japan lives in peace in the midst of independent, and self-supporting Asian
nations.

That kind of a situation would contribute enormously to the security

of the United States and all countries with interests in the Western Pacific.
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consequent benefit to us as well as to others.

It would provide an atmosphere

in which the concept of human freedom can survive and gro w in the Far East.
We may not be able to achieve these objectives next year, five
years from now , or fifty.

But let us at least keep in mind what they are.

Let us know where we are trying to go before we set out.
What is of the greatest significance in these American objectives
of security, trade, freedom and scientific and cultural exchange is that they
need not conflict with the interests, the real interests of the Japanese people,
the Filipinos or any other peoples in the Western Pacific, including the
Chinese people as distinct from their masters .

Our national interests are

in harmony, not in dissonance with those of all peoples in the Far East except
a small power-drunk minority .

That minority of arrogant would-be conquerors,

have kept the region in turmoil through the past decade.

They have exacted

a vast tribute of human suffering and material sacrifice to feed their ambitions .
With that minority, wherever it may raise its head in the region,
there can be no compromise of principle.

Nor need there be.

So long as it is

clear that our national objectives are in accord with those of the people of the
area, we shall not lack allies in this e truggle, whether it lasts one year or a
hundred, whether it is peaceful or violent.
It is one thing to define objectives.

It is another to achieve them.

We cannot will our objectives into being by the wave of a wand.
them into being.
being.

We cannot talk them into being .

We cannot buy

VIe cannot bomb them into
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We can only work, steadily to bring them into being.
approach there is a limitation.

Even in this

Enormous historical forces -- some ancient,

some modern -- are present in Asia.

Nationalism, democracy, religion,

Marxism, technological development, population pressures, and many others
move throughout the region in obscure patterns.

Responsibility for creating

circumstances of peace and progress in the Far East out of the interplay of
these forces rests in the first instance with the people of each Asian nation;
beyond them, with the region as a whole.

The amount of lasting influence which

this country or any other country outside the region can exert by foreign
policies alone over the flow of events in Asia is far less than that which we
exercise over a Mississippi or a Missouri.

Our foreign policy, whether it

involves military, economic or diplomatic measures, has a role to play in this
situation but it is, at most, a peripheral role.
But just as we do not abandon flood control because the rivers are
not easily tamed, we cannot abandon our legitimate objectives in the Far East.
For, we will either work with others for the ends of common security and
progress in the Western Pacific, for a peace of free men -- or we shall work
much harder merely to save our skins when some new crisis finally flows
over the flood-stage into a great new war.
Those are the alternatives before us. If the American people know
the facts, if their leadership is genuinely positive, there is little doubt as to
the choice.
Some of the most important of these facts concern Japan.
be faced bluntly and they must be faced now.

They must

- 8 Since the end of World War II, the Japanese people have moved a
long way from the repressive institutions which led them into that disastrous
conflict.

There are now strong forces for peaceful democratic progress workinE

inside Japan.

This does not mean, however, that the

Japan~se

manently free of the dangers of aggressive totalitarianism.

people are per-

It would be

delusive for them as well as for ourselves to assume that they are.

A new

totalitarianism could be induced in Japan either by Asian communism from the
mainland or by regressive forces within Japanese society itself or by a strange
alliance of both.
Under the occupation, this country did much to encourage the growth
of free and peaceful institutions in Japan.

The Japanese Peace Treaty negotiated

by the present Secretary of State under the previous Administration was an
admirable attempt to consolidate those gains.
The Occupation and the Treaty on the whole were actions of an
America which, with restraint and dignity, sought to conlribute to the development of a situation of mutual benefit to all in the Far East.
not easily be lost on the Japanese people.

Their effects will

They will weigh heavily in the

balance of the future of Japan.
Will they be sufficient, however, to tip the balance towards peace
and progress in Japan?

Do they offset the alternating attraction and fear

engendered by Asian communism across the China Seas? Above all, aro they
adequate to allay the threat of hunger which hangs over the Japanese people?
It does little good to set a man free, if the door to elementary sur-

vival and

dev~lopment

is shut in his face.

And what is true of men is in many
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ways true of nations.

That is the first reality which must be faced with

respect to the Japanese situation.
Within Japan, measures can be taken which will go a long way towards
dealing with this problem.

I do not propose to catalogue the ills that beset the

Japanese economic structure and their remedies.

That is hardly the function

of the government of the United States, let alone of the Senate.

The Japanese

know what the ills are; they have expounded at length in the public press and in
the Diet on the inequities and inefficiencies which result from them.
The initiative, the leadership in correcting these ills must come
from within Japan itself.
other country.

This country cannot presume to supply it, nor can any

To attempt to do so would simply result, as it has elsewhere in

Asia, in the expenditure of vast sums with little tangible accomplishment.
There are other aspects of the Japanese situation, however, with
which in concert with other nations we must deal if there is to be peace in the
Far East.

To put the problem bluntly, the Japanese people must fish and trade

abroad on a vast scale if they are to sustain themselves in a tolerable fashion.
They have been able to do neither adequately since World War II.
Important fishing grounds off the North Asian coast have been closed
to them by the policies of the communist countries and Korea.

Their trade

with the Asian mainland, once a mainstay of their economy, has been reduced
almost to insignificance.

Their commercial relations with Southeast Asia and

the rest of the world hardly begin to meet their needs.
In the past 10 years, the margin between survival and starvation for
millions o£ Japanese has been provided largely by the United States. Billions

1
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of dollars have been made a•Jailable in direct aid or by purchase

in connection

with the Korean conflict and defense requirements in the 'tea tern Pacific.
Outlays of this kind are palliatives, not cures.

A

l~uting

aolution

to Japan• s economic diler.1rr.a as I mentioned before, depends in part on action a
which can only be taken by the Japanese themselves.

It also depends in part on

the policies and attitudes of other nations, particularly those with a vital stake
in the Far East.
I raised this question in my remarks in the Senate last August in
these terms:
Unless concerted steps are taken ••• where arc the Japanese
to turn for survival? There is no reason to assume that
they will not turn away from the present alinement (with
the free nations). There is no reason to assume that
they will not veer toward Communist China, toward the
Soviet Union or both.
To the best of my knowledge, concerted steps have not been taken.

la it any wonder, then, that the new Japanese government under Premier
Hatoyama has come to office largely on a platform of "normalizing" relations
with the Asian mainland?

If the communist countries seek to weaken the ties which presently
hold Japan to freedom, they are not without resources to achieve this objective.
Trade inducements can be offered particularly with respect to the Soviet
Maritime provinces, Manchuria and North China.

There are fishing and other

concessions which could be made in and around Sakhalin and the Kuriles.
coal and other resources can come from Northern Viet Nam.

Rice,
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With more crisis-

foreign policy? With millions in new aid? By a competition of concessions
with the Communist countries for Japan's favor? Our national interests have
been obscured time and again, by ill-conceived negative measures of that kind,
'\\'ben I spoke on this subject last year there was still ample time to
provide leadership to the free nations in developing common policies r especting
Japan.

Months have gone by and little appears to have been done,

drifted and drifted, only to find ourselves back once again at Yalta.

We have
The needle

of the compass apparently can direct us to no other point on the globe.
And while we are constantly beckoned backwards in this manner,
events have moved fo rward in the Far East.

Japan is now on the verge of

transcendent decisions which will move the bal ance in Asia towards peace or
towards war,

Other nations, including our own, cannot evade partial responsi-

bility fo r the manner in which these decisions are made.
I do not know whether the Japanese will choose the path of peace.
The fo r eign policies of this or any other country cannot force or bribe the
Japanese into peace, the peace of free men.

That is a decision which they must

make themselves.
What we can do, what positive policies in the Far East will do, is to
work to make possible a Japanese decision for peace.

Such policies, if they

are to be effective, must come to grips with two realities in the Far Eastern
situation -- the vital political and strategic position of Japan in the Western
Pacific and the serious economic plight of the Japanese people,

There is still

..
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a third reality, and it, too, must be recognir.ed: the bitter remembrances of
peoples who were overrun uy the Japanese militarists in World \lar ll, and the
fear and suspicions which these rerr.e mbrances engender.
There are many tangible ways in which these realitie s of the Japane e
situation can be translated into positive action for peace.
illustration, point out some of them.

Let me, by way of

These illustrations are in part incorporated

into our official policy and in part they are not.

In any event, it seems to me

that a positive foreign policy on our part would seek to obtain the widest possible
international agreement on these points.
1.

Immediate admission of Japan to the United Nations.

2.

Territorial adjustments along Japan's borders.

3.

Japanese participation in any international conference for the

general settlement of Far Eastern problems.
4.

Japanese access to fishing grounds open to them before the war,

on a responsible and equitable basis .
5.

Encouragement of a regional investment pool in the Far East with

full Japanese participation.
6.

Encouragement of the use of Japanese skills in the technical

assistance programs of the Far East.
7.

Convening of a series of Far Eastern conferences to deal frankly

and realistically with the related problems of Japanese reparations and freer
trade within the region, and similar issues, the solution of which will make
possible a self-supporting Japan in a self-supporting Asia.
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These courses of action, as I pointed out, are illustrative only.
do not know if all or any of them are practicable at the moment.

I

Only the

Executive Branch which is responsible for the conduct of foreign policy is in a
position to know that. I believe, however, that action along the lines I have
outlined is essential if we are to forestall a crisis in Japan and the crisisforeign policy which will inevitably follow.

Such action can help to create a

situation in the Far East which will serve our national interests as well as the
interests of Japan and other nations.
It is not our responsibility alone to act in the present situation.
is not Japan's alone.

It

It is the common responsibility of all nations which really

desire peace and progress in the Far East.

*

*
*

*

*
*

*
*

*

